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Voluntary Appointment of Independent Directors: Evidence from Taiwan 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Using a dataset of Taiwanese listed firms from 2002 to 2015, we empirically examine 
the determinants to voluntarily appoint independent directors. 
Design/methodology/approach: We employ the panel estimation to exploit both the cross-
section and time-series nature of the data. Further, we use Tobit regression, generalised linear 
model in the additional analysis, as well as the two-stage least squares to mitigate for a possible 
endogeneity issue. 
Findings: The main findings show that Taiwanese firms with large board size tend to 
voluntarily appoint independent directors, and firms that already have independent supervisors 
more willingly to accept additional independent directors onto the board. Furthermore, 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership are positively associated with the 
voluntary appointment of independent directors. On the contrary, firms controlled by family 
members are generally reluctant to voluntarily appoint independent directors. 
Research implications/limitations: Our findings are important for managers, shareholders, 
creditors and policy makers. In particular, when considering the determinants of the voluntary 
appointment of independent directors, our results indicate that independent supervisors, outside 
shareholders and institutional investors are significant factors in influencing effective internal 
and external corporate governance mechanisms. This research work on focuses on the 
voluntary appointment of independent directors. It would be interesting to compare the 
effectiveness of voluntary appointment with mandatory appointment within Taiwan as well as 
with other jurisdictions.  
Originality/value: This study incrementally contributes to the corporate governance literature 
in several ways. First, this study extends the earlier research by using a more comprehensive 
dataset of non-financial Taiwanese firms, as well as employing alternative methodologies to 
investigate the determinants of voluntary appointment of independent directors. Second, prior 
studies tend to neglect the possible issue of using a censored and fractional dependent variable, 
the proportion of independent directors, which might yield biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates when using OLS regression estimation. Finally, this study addresses the relevant 
econometric issues by using the Tobit, generalised linear model as well as the two stage least 








The global financial crisis and numerous corporate debacles have prompted extensive internal 
corporate governance reforms across different jurisdictions. In the U.S, for example, the 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, which requires companies to 
strengthen their corporate governance by stipulating that every public company has to establish 
an audit committee, which must consist solely of independent directors. Similarly, The U.K. 
corporate governance code states that at least one-third of the total number of directors on the 
board should be non-executive directors.  Elsewhere, many jurisdictions including China, India, 
South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore also adopted similar corporate governance reforms and 
required listed firms to appoint independent directors (Black and Kim, 2012). Taiwan, which 
is the focus of this study, has also implemented a series of reforms to enhance its corporate 
governance mechanisms, and one of the most dramatic reforms was to introduce an 
independent director system. In particular, from February 2002, firms that apply for initial 
public offerings on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) have been required, to appoint at least 
two independent directors. However, this rule is not applicable to firms listed before that date, 
which are free to voluntarily appoint independent directors. Hence, Taiwanese listed firms can 
be divided into two groups, i.e. one is required by the authorities to appoint independent 
directors, while the other is encouraged but not forced to appoint independent directors. Unlike 
the aforementioned countries that have strictly demanded all listed firms to enhance board 
independence since the initial stage of their corporate governance reforms, the new regulation 
in Taiwan has a unique setting, i.e., ‘stringent enforcement’ for firms that went public after 
February 2002 and ‘flexible encouragement’ for firms that were listed prior to February 2002. 
We take advantage of this exclusive setting which is considerably different from that of other 
countries, and in doing so, we examine the determinants for existing Taiwanese listed firms 




One of the main functions of board of directors is to monitor and discipline top management 
(e.g., Fama, (1980). That is to say, the corporate board is viewed as an ultimate internal monitor 
of the firm, and its role is to provide a relatively low-cost mechanism for replacing or 
reassigning top managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Fama and 
Jensen (1983b) also argue that the corporate board can bring a valuable support function to the 
top managers in coping with specialized decision-making problems. Using Taiwanese dataset, 
Young et al. (2008) and Chou et al. (2018) provide evidence of the initial stage of the reforms 
in 2002. Therefore, we argue that it is important to provide further analysis on the determinants 
of board independence in Taiwan where the capital market is characterized as weak shareholder 
protection (Hsu et al., 2018). 
 
The percentage of firms with voluntary appointment of at least one independent director 
increases considerably from a low of 9% at the beginning of the corporate governance reforms 
in 2002 to 41% in 2015. Accordingly, the issue of the determinants of the voluntary 
appointment of independent directors for Taiwanese firms that are free from the mandatory 
requirement is an interesting research topic. Our main results show that Taiwanese firms with 
large board size tend to voluntarily appoint independent directors. In addition, we observe that 
firms that already have independent supervisors more willingly to appoint additional 
independent directors onto the board. As for ownership structure variables, ownership 
concentration is positively associated with voluntary appointment of independent directors. 
Moreover, we find that institutional ownership is a significant determinant of board 
independence. Our results also show that firms controlled by family members are reluctant to 




This study contributes to the corporate governance literature in several ways. First, this study 
extends the earlier research by using a more comprehensive dataset of non-financial Taiwanese 
firms, as well as employing alternative methodologies to investigate the determinants of 
voluntary appointment of independent directors. In particular, we add to the extant literature 
the important roles of board size and ownership concentration in the appointment of 
independent directors. Second, prior studies tend to neglect the possible issue of using a 
censored and fractional dependent variable, the proportion of independent directors, which 
might yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates when using OLS regression estimation. 
Finally, this study addresses the relevant econometric issues by using the Tobit regression 
(Brooks, 2008), generalized linear model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996), as well as the two 
stage least squares for a possible endogeneity concern (Chou et al., 2018). 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
Taiwanese institutional background. Section 3 discusses the prior literature as to the 
determinants of board independence as well as the development of hypotheses. Section 4 
explains the methodological aspects being used in the current study and the variables used in 
developing the hypotheses. Section 5 reports our main findings, analyses of the statistical 
methods applied to the sample data, and the results of robustness tests. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
Taiwan has implemented a series of reforms to enhance its corporate governance mechanisms. 
For instance, to allow professionals without shareholdings to become independent directors, 
the Company Act was amended in November 2001 to abolish the constraint that directors 
should be elected only from among shareholders. In addition, in 2002 the TWSE amended the 
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rules which for the first time required firms applying for initial public offerings (IPOs) on the 
TWSE to appoint at least two independent directors. Similarly, in 2002 the GreTai Securities 
Market (GTSM) also introduced similar rules which likewise for the first time required firms 
applying for IPOs to appoint independent directors. Moreover, Article 14-2 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act, which were added in 2006, encourages firms to appoint independent 
directors, not less than two in number and not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors, 
in accordance with their articles of incorporation. This regulation, enforced from 1st January 
2007, has enhanced the Taiwanese independent director system. 
 
Later in 2006, in order to comply with the new additional regulation, the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC, the authorities of listed firms) Interpretation required all public financial 
institutions such as financial holding firms, banks, bills finance firms, insurance firms, 
securities firms and also listed firms in the non-financial sector with paid-in capital of more 
than 50 billion New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) (around USD1.4 billion) to mandatorily appoint 
independent directors, at least two in number and at least one-fifth of the total number of 
directors on the board. This Interpretation was later replaced, effective on 22nd March 2011, 
which required all public financial institutions and those non-financial listed firms with paid-
in capital over NT$10 billion (around £0.3 billion) to appoint at least two independent directors, 
with no less than one-fifth of the number of directors on the board. In the final stage of the 
reform, all listed firms are required to appoint independent directors on their boards by the end 
of 2016. Hence, prior to the final reform in 2016, listed firms in Taiwan were divided into two 
groups. In the first group, firms, which applied to be listed on the TWSE (GTSM) before 22nd 
(25th) February 2002, are not forced to with a few exceptions, but are free to appoint 
independent directors. These firms can be further divided into three sub-groups: (i) firms that 
do not have independent directors; (ii) firms that voluntarily appointed independent directors; 
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(iii) firms that mandatorily appointed independent directors. In the second group, however, 
according to the amended rules firms that applied to go public after 22nd (25th) February 2002 
must have at least two independent directors on the board.1 
 
3. Prior Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
Extant studies argue that outside directors are more likely to be added to the board when a CEO 
nears retirement, when firms perform poorly, when firms leave product markets, and perhaps 
when there is a new CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Li (1994) uses 390 large 
manufacturing firms from Japan, Western Europe, and the United States to examine the 
relationship between structures of ownership and composition of boards of directors. The 
results show that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of outside directors on 
the board and either high ownership concentration structure or bank control, while state-owned 
firms are more likely to have outside directors on the board. Similarly, Bathala and Rao (1995), 
find a negative relationship between the proportion of external board directors and the dividend 
payout ratio, the debt leverage, and the proportion of equity held by insiders. Also, board 
composition is found to be systematically correlated with a number of other variables such as 
institutional shareholding, growth, length of CEO tenure and earnings volatility. 
 
In addition, using a sample of 583 public corporations over the ten-year period 1983–1992, 
Denis and Sarin (1999) conclude that changes in ownership structure and board composition 
are significantly related to top executive turnover, corporate control threats, and previous stock 
price performance, but are only weakly related to changes in firm-specific determinants 
including stock return variance, leverage, firm size and growth opportunities. They also find 
                                                 
1 Article 9 of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Rules Governing Review of Securities Listings and Article 
10 of the GreTai Securities Market Rules Governing the Review of Securities for Trading on the GTSM. 
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that large changes in ownership and board composition are generally followed by large-scale 
asset restructurings and preceded by economic shocks. Mak and Li (2001) provide evidence on 
the determinants and interrelationship among corporate ownership and board structure 
characteristics of a sample of Singapore-listed firms, which shows a negative relationship 
between the proportions of outside directors and managerial ownership, government ownership, 
and board size. Besides, firms with higher block-holder ownership, less regulation, and longer 
CEO tenure tend to employ a dual leadership structure. Prevost et al. (2002) find that the 
percentage of outside directors on the board is negatively associated with the percentage of 
inside ownership, firm size, growth opportunity and dual CEO positions, but is positively 
related to concentrated ownership, debt leverage and profitability, whilst the proportion of 
outsiders increased following the passing of the reformed company and securities law 
legislation in 1993 in New Zealand. 
 
Moreover, Boone et al. (2007), using a panel dataset that tracks the development of board of 
directors from a firm’s IPO until ten years later, document that: (i) board size and independence 
are positively related to firm size and diversification, (ii) board size is inversely related to firm-
specific benefits and positively related to costs of monitoring, and (iii) board independence is 
inversely related to the manager’s influence and positively related to restrictions on that 
influence. Linck et al. (2008) examine the development and determinants of board structure 
for a broad sample of 6,931 firms from 1990 to 2004, and find that board size and independence 
are negatively associated with growth opportunity, R&D expenditures, stock return volatility 
and managerial ownership, but are positively associated with firm size. Also, the board of 
directors is more independent when inside directors have more opportunity to extract private 
benefits and when the CEO has greater influence over the board. Analyzing a sample of 8,165 
observations from 1992 to 2001, Coles et al. (2008) point out that board size and the proportion 
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of outsiders are positively related to firm size, diversification and leverage, while insider 
representation on the board is only weakly related to R&D intensity. Similarly, Guest (2008) 
studies the trends and determinants of board size and composition with a large sample of UK 
firms over the period 1981–2002. The findings conclude that board size and outside director 
percentage are directly impacted by advising needs and inversely impacted by CEO influence, 
whilst board size and the number and percentage of non-executive directors increased 
following the passing of the Cadbury Report. 
 
Furthermore, Lehn et al. (2009) find that board size is negatively correlated with firm size but 
positively correlated with growth opportunity, whereas the presence of insider directors on the 
board is positively correlated with firm size and negatively correlated with growth opportunity. 
Ting (2011) has studied the determinants of board size and composition in the Taiwanese 
banking industry, and reveals that firm size and firm age are the key determinants of board size, 
and board independence decreases under the ownership of controlling shareholders and 
increases under the ownership of outside directors. Analyzing a large panel dataset over the 
period 1999–2003 in China, Chen and AI-Najjar (2012) indicate that board size is directly 
related to the number of supervisors, firm size, firm performance, and firm value, but is 
inversely related to ownership concentration, while board independence is inversely related to 
the number of supervisors and state ownership. De Andres et al. (2012) investigate the factors 
influencing the board composition of an international sample of commercial banks from 1996 
to 2006, and find that board size and independence are higher when firms are more complex, 
have a low ownership concentration, and are headquartered in a civil law country; and that 




As shown above, there are numerous factors that determine board independence. However, in 
this study, in order to derive and examine hypotheses on the factors that motivate firms to 
voluntarily appoint independent directors, we classify the existing literature on corporate board 
determinants from previous discussion into the following two dimensions: board characteristics 
and ownership structure. 
 
Board Characteristics and Board Independence 
Prior literature argues that the quality and efficiency of the decision making of a small board 
is much better than that of a large board (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996). In addition, 
larger board size leads to less coordination, more communication difficulty and more free-
riding issues (Ahmed et al., 2006; Raheja, 2005; Ramdani and van Witteloostuijn, 2010), and 
thus a larger likelihood of being controlled by a dominant CEO (Jensen, 1993). Moreover, past 
empirical research suggests that firms with a larger board of directors tend to have more outside 
directors (Herrera-Echeverri et al., 2016). In their analysis of a large sample of 6,931 US firms 
from 1990 to 2004, Linck et al. (2008) find that board independence is significantly and 
positively related to board size. Furthermore, Prevost et al. (2002), Hillier and McColgan 
(2006), and Iwasaki (2008) report that board size has a positive but statistically weak impact 
on board independence in New Zealand, UK, and Russia, respectively. Therefore, we expect 
that the larger the board size, and hence the weaker the monitoring function, the higher the 
demand for the oversight of independent directors, and this suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H1.1: Board size is positively related to the proportion of independent directors 
 
Jensen (1993) argues that having different persons serving as the CEO and chairman of the 
board enhances the monitoring ability of the board. Likewise, Fama and Jensen (1983b) point 
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out that separating decision management and decision control power improves the 
effectiveness in monitoring the CEO. In addition, in empirical research based on 284 New 
Zealand firms from 1991 to 1995, Prevost et al. (2002) report that board independence is 
negatively associated with dual CEO positions. Moreover, in their analysis of 683 non-financial 
UK firms over the period 1992–1997, Hillier and McColgan (2006) document that firms which 
separate the roles of chairman and CEO have a higher proportion of outside directors. Similarly, 
using a unique dataset of 730 joint-stock Russian firms, Iwasaki (2008) finds that a board 
chairman appointed from the outside tends to enhance board independence. Recently, Chen 
and Al-Najjar (2012) have indicated that there is a negative relationship between the proportion 
of independent directors and CEO duality in China, using a sample 5,133 firm-year 
observations from 1999 to 2003. Thus we predict that when the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board, firms are less likely to appoint independent directors, which suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1.2: Board leadership is negatively related to the proportion of independent directors 
 
In addition to the board of directors, firms in Taiwan also have a board of supervisors, 
functioning in a capacity similar to that of an audit committee as required in other jurisdictions. 
The primary responsibilities and powers of these supervisors are to investigate and oversee 
directors’ behaviour, audit firms’ financial reports, and scrutinize firms’ operations at any time. 
There is some overlap between the duties of the supervisors and those of independent directors. 
Therefore, if the supervisors fully enforce their power, then there is less need to appoint 
independent directors to play the role of overseers. Supporting evidence for this is provided in 
the findings of Young et al. (2008), who report a negative but slight effect of the proportion of 
independent supervisors on board independence, based on a sample of 943 firms listed on the 
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Taiwan Stock Exchange for the years 2001 and 2002. Therefore, we predict that as an 
alternative corporate governance mechanism, independent supervisors are a substitute for 
independent directors. The following hypothesis is then proposed: 
 
H1.3: The proportion of independent supervisors is negatively related to the proportion of 
independent directors 
 
Ownership Structure and Board Independence 
Ownership concentration in the form of block-holders’ ownership is viewed as a governance 
mechanism that can substitute for the monitoring function of a board of directors through the 
following actions: (i) facilitate takeovers (Shivdasani, 1993), (ii) remove managers who do not 
maximize shareholders’ value (Kaplan and Minton, 1994), and (iii) suppress CEOs’ excess 
compensation (Core et al., 1999). Supporting empirical evidence, such as Li (1994) in ten 
industrial countries, Mak and Li (2001) in Singapore, and Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) in China, 
indicates that the proportion of independent directors and block-holders’ ownership are 
substitutes, i.e. are negatively related. However, it is not clear whether in Taiwan we would 
necessarily observe this negative relationship. Young et al. (2008) observe that the higher the 
block-holders’ ownership in Taiwan, the higher the proportion of independent directors. 
Further, since hostile takeovers are in practice almost non-existent in Taiwan, block-holders 
are unlikely to enhance monitoring by facilitating takeovers. Thus, block-holders are more 
likely to improve corporate governance by raising the ability to fire executives who are unable 
to maximize shareholders’ wealth or by restraining CEOs’ excess compensation. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the most direct and cost-effective way for block-holders to improve 
corporate governance is to enhance board independence (Mak and Li, 2001), i.e. by adding 
more independent directors to the board. Supporting evidence is provided by several empirical 
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studies (Iwasaki, 2008; Lasfer, 2006; Prevost et al., 2002). Accordingly, we expect that when 
block-holders’ ownership increases, the demand for independent directors also increases, 
which suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2.1: The proportion of independent directors is positively related to block-holders’ 
ownership. 
 
Institutional investors are more active than others and have greater needs for better corporate 
governance (Coffee, 1991). Typically, institutional investors disappointed with management 
or firm performance can pursue a mechanism through simply selling their shareholdings 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995). However, as their shareholdings are normally so large, the shares 
cannot be sold without steep drops in stock prices and further losses (Gillan and Starks, 2000). 
Therefore, institutional investors have to look for other corporate governance mechanisms to 
reduce the conflict of interest between management and shareholders. Bathala and Rao (1995) 
argue that institutional investors have sought to enhance managerial accountability through the 
addition of outside members to the board. In addition, Brigham and Daves (2012) note that 
institutional investors are known to support more independent directors on the board. Moreover, 
in their analysis of securities litigation from 1996 to 2005, Cheng et al. (2010) find that 
defendant firms with institutional plaintiffs experience greater improvement in their board 
independence subsequent to the lawsuit filing. Accordingly, it is predicted that firms with a 
higher proportion of institutional ownership have more independent directors on the board, 
which suggests the following hypothesis: 
 





Families have a powerful incentive to expropriate wealth by seeking private interests at the 
expense of minority investors (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, unlike 
the traditional agency problem between managers and shareholders, the agency conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders might be more prevalent in family-
controlled firms (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). For example, using a sample of 5,897 financial 
and non-financial corporations in East Asia and Western Europe, Faccio et al. (2001) find that 
families with control greater than their cash flow rights tend to expropriate wealth. In addition, 
in their analysis of a sample of 253 US family-controlled firms over a four-year period from 
1995 to 1998, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) indicate that family control is correlated with greater 
managerial entrenchment. In Taiwan, Yeh and Woidtke (2005) find that family firms are 
associated with strong and negative entrenchment effects or larger agency problems. Moreover, 
Young et al. (2008) report that board independence in Taiwan is negatively related to firms 
controlled by one family. Therefore, we expect that family-controlled firms are less likely to 
appoint independent directors, which suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2.3: The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to family control. 
 
4. Research Design 
This study uses a dataset of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) for the years 
2002–2015.2 All the data regarding financial statements, stock prices, board characteristics, 
and ownership structure, are drawn from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. The 
preliminary sample size for firms listed on the TWSE from 2002 to 2015 is 10,479. We then 
                                                 
2 Our sample period ends in 2015 due to the fact that the Taiwanese Financial Supervisory Commission has 
mandated that all listed firms to appoint independent directors from 2016 onwards. 
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exclude 539 observations for firms in the financial, securities and insurance industries, and 177 
observations for foreign firms issuing depository receipts in Taiwan, because their regulatory 
and reporting regimes are considerably different from firms in other industries. We further 
exclude 383 observations for firms listed less than one year or firms with incomplete corporate 
governance data, and 2574 observations for firms with mandatory appointment of independent 
directors. We also exclude 877 observations for firms representing the lowest and highest one 
percent in the sample (i.e. outliers), leaving the final sample of 5,929 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 provides details about the sample selection process. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Given our dataset is an unbalanced panel data of different numbers of firms over a 14-year 
period from 2002 to 2015, we employ the panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section 
and time series nature of the data. We include industry dummy variables to control for industrial 
effects. Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is adopted to categorize our sample firms 
under nine industries: oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, 
consumer services, telecommunications, utilities, and technology. Finally, we also use year 
dummy variables in the model to capture the regulation effect which may affect the outcome 
variable. The equation specified below is established to test the hypothesis for the motives for 
firms to voluntarily appoint independent directors. 
INDBOD_R𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1BODSIZE𝑖𝑡 + α2DUALITY𝑖𝑡 + α3INDSUP𝑖𝑡
+ α4BLOCKOWN𝑖𝑡 + α5INSTOWN𝑖𝑡 + α6FAMCON𝑖𝑡
+ ∑αCONTROLS𝑖𝑡 + INDUSTRY + YEAR + ε𝑖𝑡 





where the proportion of independent directors (INDBOD_R) is calculated as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board. An independent 
director should meet all of the board independence criteria for being independent as stated in 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Regulations Governing Appointment of Independent Directors and 
Compliance Matters for Public Companies. Board size (BODSIZE) is measured as the total 
number of directors on the board. Board leadership (DUALITY) is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise. The 
proportion of independent supervisors (INDSUP) is calculated as the number of independent 
supervisors divided by the total number of supervisors. Similar to independent directors, an 
independent supervisor is also an important monitor of the firm and is defined as one who 
meets all of the criteria in regard to the independence of supervisors for being independent. 
Following Young et al., block-holders’ ownership (BLOCKOWN) is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by the ten largest outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at 
least 5% of shares outstanding. Institutional ownership (INSTOWN) is measured as the 
proportion of shares owned by institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders include 
both foreign and domestic financial institutions (e.g., investment trust funds, securities dealers). 
Family control (FAMCON) is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if over one-half of the 
directors are members of one family, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Following prior literature, we include a number of control variables in the regression models:  
First, firm size (FIRMSIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. Larger firms are expected to correlate with more complex operations which create more 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Young et al., 2008). All of the above 
arguments support the evidence that larger firms demand more independent directors on the 
board (Germain et al., 2014). Therefore, the current study expects to find that in order to 
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mitigate the agency problems with firm size, the larger the firm size, the higher the proportion 
of independent directors. Second, growth opportunity (GROWTH) is measured as the ratio of 
current year sales minus prior year sales divided by prior year sales. Lehn et al. (2009) argue 
that firms with a high growth opportunity are correlated with the information asymmetries 
which are likely to result in higher insider ownership of equity. Consistent with this argument, 
Bathala and Rao (1995), and Denis and Sarin (1999), find that there is a negative relationship 
between growth opportunity and the proportion of independent directors. Thus, GROWTH is 
predicted to be negatively associated with board independence. Third, leverage (LEV) is 
measured as the ratio of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that conflicts between shareholders and creditors increase with firms’ 
leverage. The demand for monitoring by independent directors is then expected to be higher 
among high leveraged firms (Karim et al., 2020)Therefore, we expect that firms with a higher 
leverage tend to voluntarily appoint independent directors. 
 
Fourth, return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes divided by the 
book value of average total assets. Firms with better performance tend to appoint independent 
directors so as to convince investors of their quality financial statements (Malik and Makhdoom, 
2016; Matias Gama and Rodrigues, 2013). Therefore, we predict a positive relationship 
between firm performance and board independence (Chijoke-Mgbame et al., 2020; Fernández-
Temprano and Tejerina-Gaite, 2020; Kao et al., 2019). Fifth, firm age (FIRMAGE) is measured 
as the number of years that a firm has operated. Some studies argue that firms with a longer 
history are more complex and demand more experience and skills (Raheja, 2005). On the other 
hand, Fraile and Fradejas (2014) report a negative association between firm age and board 
independence. Therefore, FIRMAGE is used to control for the potential impact of firm age on 
board independence, and no sign is predicted to this variable. Finally, R&D ratio (RD) is 
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calculated by dividing the ratio of R&D expenditure by total sales. Coles et al. (2008) argue 
that firms with higher R&D intensity have more inside directors. However, in their empirical 
research, Boone et al. (2007), and AlHares (2020) find a positive association of R&D 
expenditure with board independence. Thus, we use R&D to control its possible effect on board 
independence, but do not predict a direction of the relationship between R&D ratio and board 
independence. Table 2 below provides the definition of the research variables employed in the 
model. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Given the observed data with many observations on the dependent variable censored at zero, 
fixed effects estimation may not be appropriate and would yield biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates, and an approach based on maximum likelihood should be used. Therefore, 
in order to prevent possible biased and inconsistent results from the fixed effects estimation, 
we use a Tobit regression by maximum likelihood method to estimate the equation (1).3 
Furthermore, there is another concern about a fractional response variable, having values that 
fall between zero and one. Generally, it would be beneficial to have predicted values that also 
fall between zero and one, but if the estimation is made by using a linear function, the predicted 
values may fall above one or below zero. A traditional way to deal with this problem is to 
conduct a logit transformation on the data and then fit the model using OLS estimation (Balassa, 
1986). However, when a logit transformation is performed, there is a disadvantage of excluding 
all observations where the dependent variable takes values of zero or one. Therefore, a better 
                                                 
3 When censored regression estimations are used, values that fall at or below/above some threshold are censored. 
“Even though the dependent variable is censored, the corresponding values of the independent variables are still 
observable.” (Brooks, 2008, p.535). 
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alternative is to estimate by using a generalized linear model (GLM) with a logit link and a 
binomial family, which is proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).4  In our study, the 
dependent variable INDBOD_R is a proportion bounded by zero and one (0 ≤ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑂𝐷_𝑅 ≤
1). Accordingly, as a robustness test, we also employ GLM with a logit link and a binomial 
family to estimate the equation (1) as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996; 2008). 
 
5.  Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 below reports the descriptive statistics of the research variables employed in this study 
for samples from 2002 to 2015. The results regarding the dependent variable show that the 
proportion of independent directors (INDBOD_R) has an average of only 3.02% and a median 
of 0, indicating that there are still many firms which do not have independent directors. 
Compared with the proportions of independent directors in other countries, for example, 56%, 
41%, 46%, 57% for the US (Boone et al., 2007), UK (Guest, 2008), Australia (Arthur, 2001) 
and Singapore (Mak and Li, 2001), respectively, the proportion in Taiwan is considerably 
lower. One possible reason for this is that the definition of independent directors is different 
from other jurisdictions. In Mak and Li’s (2001) paper, independent directors are defined as 
members of boards of directors other than executive directors, affiliated directors, and grey 
directors, whereas the definition of independent directors is more rigid in Taiwan (e.g., it 
includes professional qualification criteria and direct or indirect status). 
 
Regarding board characteristics variables, the average number of directors on the board 
(BODSIZE) is 9.46 (with a minimum of 5 and maximum of 22), which is smaller than the mean 
                                                 
4 In their later study, Papke and Wooldridge (2008) extend their earlier work on cross-sectional data to panel 
data, showing how to specify and estimate fractional response models by using panel data. 
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numbers of 11.88 and 12.03 for listed firms in the US, reported by Fitch and Shivdasani (2006), 
and UK, reported by De Andres et al. (2005), respectively; but which is larger than the mean 
numbers of 5.56 and 8.04 for listed firms in Australia (Arthur, 2001) and Singapore (Mak and 
Li, 2001), respectively. In addition, approximately 29.8% of the sample firms’ CEOs are also 
the chairmen of the board of directors (DUALITY). Lastly, the proportion of independent 
supervisors (INDSUP) is on average 3.10% with a median of 0, implying that most supervisors 
in the sample firms are not independent. 
 
The next three rows in the table report the ownership structure variables. The average (median) 
block-holders’ ownership (BLOCKOWN) is 19.75% (18.11%), with a maximum of 79.81%. In 
addition, the average (median) institutional ownership (INSTOWN) has a low of 1.99% (0.21%), 
which is considerably lower than the mean of 34.16% in the US (Linck et al., 2008). This result 
implies that institutional investors constitute only a small proportion of firm ownership for the 
sample firms. Lastly, based on the definition of this study, nearly 72% of the sample firms’ 
boards of directors are controlled by family members (FAMCON). 
 
With regard to control variables, the average firm size (FIRMSIZE) is about 15.80 billion NTD 
(New Taiwan Dollars), the average growth opportunity (GROWTH) is 6.13%, and the average 
debt ratio (LEV) is 37.54%. In addition, the average return on asset (ROA) is 4.80%, the average 
firms age is 33.07 years, and the average R&D ratio is a low 1.92%. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the correlation matrix amongst the independent variables used in 
the regressions for the sample over the period 2002–2015. The correlation coefficients between 
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all independent variables are small (with a maximum absolute value of 0.294), suggesting no 
multicollinearity problem.5 In the current study, we also use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
to double-check for any multicollinearity issue. The largest VIF is for the firm size (FIRMSIZE) 
(1.36), whereas the lowest VIF is for the board leadership (DUALITY) and proportion of 
independent supervisors (INDSUP) (1.05). As a result, the VIFs vary from 1.05 to 1.36 (with 
a mean of 1.18, not reported in the table), which are all lower than the critical value of 10. 
Therefore, the regression models used to test the hypotheses are relatively free from 
multicollinearity problems. The highest absolute value of correlation coefficient is the 
correlation between the firm age (FIRMAGE) and R&D ratio (RD) (r = -0.294, p < 0.01), 
indicating that firms with higher R&D expenditures are younger than those with lower R&D 
expenditures. In addition, firm size (FIRMSIZE) is positively related to the board size 
(BODSIZE) (r = 0.289, p < 0.01), implying that large firms tend to have a larger board of 
directors than do small firms. Moreover, the larger the firm size (FIRMSIZE), the larger the 
institutional ownership (INSTOWN) (r = 0.304, p < 0.01), showing that large firms are more 
attractive to institutional investors. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Multivariate Results 
Column 1 of Table 5 provides the fixed regression results of board independence on board 
characteristics, ownership structure, and control variables, i.e. the model (1). With respect to 
board characteristics variables, the coefficient of BODSIZE is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that board size is not a significant determinant of voluntary appointment of 
independent directors. This result does not support Hypothesis 1.1 but is consistent with Hillier 
and McColgan (2006), and Iwasaki (2008). In addition, the coefficient of DUALITY is 
                                                 
5 Multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 1995) 
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insignificant, thus contradicting Hypothesis 1.2. In line with Young et al. (2008), and Chen and 
Al-Najjar (2012), this result indicates that board independence is not affected by board 
leadership (i.e., having the same person serving as both CEO and chairman of the board). 
Moreover, the relationship between INDSUP and INDBOD_R is significantly positive (p < 
0.01). The result fails to support Hypothesis 1.3 arguing a negative association, but is consistent 
with the intuition that firms which already have independent supervisors find it easier to accept 
more independent directors on the board. 
 
As regards ownership structure variables, INDBOD_R is positively related to BLOCKOWN 
and significant at the 1% level, supporting Hypothesis 2.1. This result is in line with the 
evidence documented by Prevost et al. (2002), and Iwasaki (2008). In addition, the coefficient 
of INSTOWN is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that firms with higher 
institutional ownership tend to voluntarily appoint independent directors. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2.2 is supported and is consistent with the study of Chung et al. (2019), and Bansal 
and Thenmozhi (2020). In contrast, consistent with Young et al. (2008), the coefficient of 
FAMCON is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result supports Hypothesis 2.3 and 
the evidence provided by Vieira (2018), and Crisóstomo and de Freitas Brandão (2019), 
indicating that firms controlled by family members are reluctant to appoint independent 
directors. 
 
In terms of control variables, the coefficient of FIRMSIZE is significantly and positively 
associated with INDBOD_R at the 1% level, and thus in line with our expectation. This result 
implies that the bigger the firm size, the higher the board independence, which is similar to the 
research of Baker and Gompers (2003), and Guest (2008), but contradicts other studies (Berry 
et al., 2006). In addition, the relationship between GROWTH and INDBOD_R is statistically 
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insignificant. The result suggests that growth opportunity is not a significant determinant of 
voluntary appointment of independent directors, which is consistent with the findings of 
Hossain et al. (2000), and Mak and Li (2001). Moreover, the coefficient of LEV is statistically 
insignificant, which is not in line with our expectation. The result indicates that board 
independence is not affected by the firm’s leverage level, which matches the results of Lasfer 
(2006), and Hillier and McColgan (2006). 
 
The result further shows that the coefficient of ROA is positive but statistically insignificant, 
indicating that firms’ performance is not a significant determinant of board independence, and 
thus contradicting our expectation. These results are similar to those of Roudaki (2018), and 
Wang et al. (2019). In addition, the coefficient of FIRMAGE is significantly negative (p < 0.01), 
suggesting that older firms are less likely to make voluntary appointments of independent 
directors, which is in line with the studies of Denis and Sarin (1999), and Hillier and McColgan 
(2006). Finally, as expected, the relationship between R&D and INDBOD_R is significantly 
positive (p < 0.01). The result suggests that firms that have more R&D expenditures are more 
likely to voluntarily appoint independent directors, which is similar to the studies of Boone et 
al. (2007), and Coles et al. (2008). 
 
[insert Table 5 here] 
 
Additional analyses 
As mentioned in the previous section, given that our dependent variable INDBOD_R is 
censored at zero, the fixed effects estimation might yield biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates. Accordingly, to prevent a possible problem from the fixed effects estimation, we 
employ a Tobit model based on maximum likelihood method to estimate equation (1). The 
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results of the Tobit regression are presented in column 2 of Table 5. These empirical results 
remain qualitatively similar to those from the fixed effects estimation in column 1, except for 
the results of BODSIZE and LEV. In the Tobit regression, the coefficient of BODSIZE is 
positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that firms with large boards tend to 
voluntarily appoint independent directors. This result supports Hypothesis 1.1 and is consistent 
with Linck et al. (2008). Similarly, the coefficient of LEV is significantly and positively 
associated with INDBOD_R (p < 0.05), which is consistent with our expectation. The result 
suggests that the higher the firm’s leverage level, the more the need for independent directors, 
which matches the results of Linck et al. (2008), and Iwasaki (2008). 
 
As discussed earlier, when using a linear estimation, there might be a problem from a fractional 
response variable (i.e., 0 ≤ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑂𝐷_𝑅 ≤ 1). Therefore, as a robustness check, we also use 
GLM with a logit link and a binomial family to estimate the equation (1). The results of the 
GLM regression are presented in column 3 of Table 5. Our findings are qualitatively similar to 
the regression results from the fixed effects estimation in column 1, and the Tobit model in 
column 2. 
 
Finally, the independent variables used in the current study, i.e. board characteristics and 
ownership structure, may be determined simultaneously with the board independence. As a 
result, the panel regression model may be biased and inconsistent, and therefore cannot be used 
to make inferences about the causality of the relationship. As a robustness check, this study 
addresses the possible impact of endogeneity by using the instrumental variable method with a 
single-equation two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation (Patro et al., 2018; Uribe-Bohorquez 
et al., 2018) to re-estimate the equation (1). Lagged values of board characteristics and 
ownership structure variables are employed as the instrumental variables to control for 
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potential endogeneity. The results for 2SLS regression are presented in Table 6, and are 
qualitatively consistent with the regression results from the fixed effects estimation in Table 5.  
 
[insert Table 6 here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
Since February 2002, both the TWSE and GTSM have mandated IPO firms to have at least 
two independent directors on their boards. The authority further gradually expands the scope 
of mandatory requirement of board independence for listed firms in 2006 and 2011. However, 
there are numerous firms not required by these regulations voluntarily adding independent 
directors to the boards. To exploit this unique setting, this paper investigates the determinants 
of voluntary appointment of independent directors using a dataset of Taiwanese non-financial 
listed firms. Our findings indicate that Taiwanese firms with large board size tend to voluntarily 
appoint independent directors. However, we find that there is no linkage between board 
independence and board leadership. In addition, we observe that firms which already have 
independent supervisors more easily accept further independent directors on the board. As 
regards ownership structure, board independence is positively related to ownership 
concentration. We also observe that institutional ownership is a significant determinant of 
board independence. In contrast, however, our results show that firms controlled by family 
members are generally reluctant to voluntarily appoint independent directors.  
 
Our findings are important for managers, shareholders, creditors and policy makers, and have 
the following main implications. In determining the voluntary appointment of independent 
directors, our findings indicate that independent supervisors, outside shareholders and 
institutional investors are significant factors in influencing internal and external corporate 
26 
 
governance mechanisms. In contrast, firms with boards of directors dominated by family 
members (i.e., family-controlled firms) tend not to host independent directors and usually 
refuse to enhance the quality of corporate governance. The results imply that the persistent 
expropriation problems, emanated from family-dominated boards, between controlling and 
minority shareholders should be a focus of the government interference. We suggest several 
possible avenues for future research. First, Hwang and Kim (2009) find that when considering 
informal social ties between directors and CEOs, the independence of US boards drops to 62% 
from 87% under the conventional regulatory definition. Therefore, refining the definition of 
independence beyond conventional regulatory definitions could advance our understanding as 
to determinants of board independence. Second, our findings indicate that family-controlled 
firms are associated with weak internal corporate governance mechanisms. Additionally, Hsu 
et al. (2018) find that family firms tend not to enhance external corporate governance 
mechanisms, i.e. higher-quality auditors. Accordingly, it would be interesting to investigate 
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Table 1 Definition of the research variables  
   Expected 
Variables Acronym Definition sign 
Dependent variable  
The proportion of 
independent directors 
INDBOD_R The proportion of independent directors over the 
total number of directors on the board. 
 
Board characteristics variables  
Board size BODSIZE The total number of directors on the board. + 
Board leadership DUALITY A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 
otherwise. 
− 
The proportion of 
independent supervisors 
INDSUP The proportion of independent supervisors over the 
total number of supervisors. 
− 
Ownership structure variables  
Block-holders’ ownership BLOCKOWN The proportion of shares owned by the ten largest 
outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at 
least 5% of shares outstanding. 
+ 
Institutional ownership INSTOWN The proportion of shares owned by institutional 
shareholders. 
+ 
Family control FAMCON A dummy variable, which equals 1 if over one-half 
of the directors are members of one family, and 0 
otherwise. 
− 
Control variables  
Firm size FIRMSIZE The natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. 
+ 
Growth opportunity GROWTH The ratio of current year sales minus prior year sales 
over prior year sales. 
− 
Leverage LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets. + 
Return on assets ROA The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over 
the book value of average total assets. 
+ 
Firm age FIRMAGE The number of years that a firm has operated. ? 




Table 2 Sample selection process 
 Firm-year 
 observations 
Preliminary sample size (2002–2015) 10,479 
Less:  
Observations in the financial sector -539 
Observations in depository receipts sector -177 
Observations listed less than one year or observations with incomplete 
data regarding corporate governance information -383 
Observations with mandatory appointment of independent directors -2,574 
Outliers -877 





Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Min. 25% Mean Median 75% Max. SD 
Dependent variable 
INDBOD_R (%) 0.000 0.000 3.023 0.000 0.000 57.143 8.002 
Board characteristics variables 
BODSIZE 5.000 7.000 9.458 9.000 10.000 22.000 2.671 
DUALITY 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.457 
INDSUP (%) 0.000 0.000 3.097 0.000 0.000 100.000 11.874 
Ownership structure variables 
BLOCKOWN (%) 0.000 11.420 19.745 18.110 26.060 79.810 11.722 
INSTOWN (%) 0.000 0.000 1.990 0.210 2.550 62.260 3.587 
FAMCON 0.000 0.000 0.722 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.448 
Control variables 
FIRMSIZE 12.188 14.984 15.798 15.655 16.436 20.890 1.202 
GROWTH (%) -67.330 -7.240 6.125 3.550 15.980 176.120 25.789 
LEV (%) 5.540 25.440 37.543 37.000 48.440 81.250 15.949 
ROA (%) -22.860 1.510 4.795 4.590 8.520 27.220 6.791 
FIRMAGE 2.995 24.096 33.065 32.537 41.452 69.715 11.996 
RD (%) 0.000 0.000 1.922 0.620 2.520 23.710 3.178 
Notes: N=5,929. The definitions of the research variables are as follows. INDBOD_R is the proportion of independent 
directors over the total number of directors on the board; BODSIZE is the total number of directors on the board; 
DUALITY is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 
otherwise; INDSUP is the proportion of independent supervisors over the total number of supervisors; BLOCKOWN 
is the proportion of shares owned by the big ten largest outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at least 5% of 
shares outstanding; INSTOWN is the proportion of shares owned by institutional shareholders; FAMCON is a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if over one-half of the directors are served by members of one family, and 0 otherwise; 
FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; GROWTH is the ratio of current year sales minus 
prior year sales over prior year sales; LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes over the book value of average total assets; FIRMAGE is the number of years that the firm has 
operated; RD is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. For the dummy (binary) variables, the mean indicates the 




Table 4 Variance Inflation Factor and Pearson correlation matrix 
 Variables VIFs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 BODSIZE 1.16 1 
         
 
2 DUALITY 1.05 -0.152a 1 
        
 
3 INDSUP 1.05 -0.012 0.062a 1 
       
 
4 BLOCKOWN 1.09 -0.137a -0.019 -0.053a 1 
      
 
5 INSTOWN 1.14 0.087a -0.038a -0.015 0.080a 1 
     
 
6 FAMCON 1.13 0.007 -0.119a -0.080a 0.006 0.004 1 
    
 
7 FIRMSIZE 1.36 0.289a -0.138a -0.018 -0.082a 0.304a 0.189a 1 
   
 
8 GROWTH 1.14 0.019 0.001 0.067a -0.056a 0.015 -0.006 0.090a 1 
  
 
9 LEV 1.26 -0.020 -0.035a -0.018 -0.008 -0.042a 0.027b 0.131a 0.074a 1 
 
 
10 ROA 1.33 0.050a -0.032b 0.075a 0.043a 0.177a -0.072a 0.183a 0.290a -0.272a 1  
11 FIRMAGE 1.25 0.142a -0.090a -0.175a 0.151a 0.045a 0.205a 0.111a -0.114a -0.064a -0.098a 1 
12 RD 1.23 -0.057a 0.091a 0.114a -0.144a 0.040a -0.194a -0.045a -0.040a -0.222a 0.032b -0.294a 
Notes: N=5,929. The definitions of the research variables are as follows. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on the board; DUALITY is a dummy variable, which equals 1 
if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise; INDSUP is the proportion of independent supervisors over the total number of supervisors; BLOCKOWN 
is the proportion of shares owned by the ten largest outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at least 5% of shares outstanding; INSTOWN is the proportion of shares owned 
by institutional shareholders; FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if over one-half of the directors are served by members of one family, and 0 otherwise; FIRMSIZE 
is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; GROWTH is the ratio of current year sales minus prior year sales over prior year sales; LEV is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over the book value of average total assets; FIRMAGE is the number of years that the firm has operated; RD is 




Table 5 Regression results of the determinants of board independence 
  Dependent variable = INDBOD_R 
Independent Expected Fixed   
Variables Sign Effects Tobit GLM 
Constant ? -0.099*** -1.020*** -8.094*** 
  (0.016) (0.090) (0.534) 
BODSIZE + -0.000 0.005** -0.002 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.015) 
DUALITY − 0.003 0.017 0.114 
  (0.002) (0.013) (0.076) 
INDSUP − 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.038*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
BLOCKOWN + 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.012*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
INSTOWN + 0.001** 0.004** 0.022*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) 
FAMCON − -0.025*** -0.111*** -0.709*** 
  (0.003) (0.013) (0.077) 
FIRMSIZE + 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.232*** 
  (0.001) (0.006) (0.036) 
GROWTH − -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
LEV + 0.000 0.001** 0.004 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
ROA + 0.000 0.001 0.005 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) 
FIRMAGE ? -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.012*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
RD ? 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.037*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.010) 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.245   
Pseudo R2   0.341  
Model F  28.609*** 47.813***  
Log likelihood  7412.962 -1248.590 -562.025 
Notes: N=5,929. The definitions of the research variables are as follows. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on 
the board; DUALITY is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, and 
0 otherwise; INDSUP is the proportion of independent supervisors over the total number of supervisors; BLOCKOWN 
is the proportion of shares owned by the ten largest outside shareholders or shareholders who hold at least 5% of shares 
outstanding; INSTOWN is the proportion of shares owned by institutional shareholders; FAMCON is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if over one-half of the directors are served by members of one family, and 0 otherwise; FIRMSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; GROWTH is the ratio of current year sales minus prior year sales 
over prior year sales; LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
over the book value of average total assets; FIRMAGE is the number of years that the firm has operated; RD is the ratio 
of R&D expenditure to total sales. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. * Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.10 level. Similar to the R2 of the OLS model, pseudo R2 measures 
the fitness of the Tobit regression mode; larger pseudo R2 statistics indicate that more of the variation is explained by the 




Table 6 2SLS Regression Results  
Independent Expected  
Variables Sign Dependent variable = INDBOD_R 
Constant ? 0.002 
  (0.015) 
BODSIZE + -0.001** 
  (0.000) 
DUALITY − 0.003 
  (0.002) 
INDSUP − 0.003*** 
  (0.000) 
BLOCKOWN + 0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
INSTOWN + 0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
FAMCON − -0.021*** 
  (0.003) 
FIRMSIZE + 0.007*** 
  (0.001) 
GROWTH − -0.000 
  (0.000) 
LEV + 0.000 
  (0.000) 
ROA + 0.000 
  (0.000) 
FIRMAGE ? -0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
RD ? 0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
Industry  Yes 
Year  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.241 
Model F  49.039*** 
Notes: N=5,871. The definitions of the research variables are as follows. BODSIZE is the total number of 
directors on the board; DUALITY is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of directors, and 0 otherwise; INDSUP is the proportion of independent supervisors over the total 
number of supervisors; BLOCKOWN is the proportion of shares owned by the ten largest outside shareholders 
or shareholders who hold at least 5% of shares outstanding; INSTOWN is the proportion of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders; FAMCON is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if over one-half of the directors 
are served by members of one family, and 0 otherwise; FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets; GROWTH is the ratio of current year sales minus prior year sales over prior year sales; LEV 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over the book 
value of average total assets; FIRMAGE is the number of years that the firm has operated; RD is the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total sales. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. * Significant at the 
0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
